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Abstract 
In recent American culture, expressions of racial prejudice have become increasingly 
subtle and ambiguous. Given such ambiguity, whether or not prejudice is perceived by observers 
may be related to individual differences in the tendency to make attributions to prejudice. The 
present set of studies test the hypothesis that the beliefs and expectations related to a propensity 
to make attributions to prejudice are moderated by different information about harm and intent 
that have been shown in previous research to influence observers’ attributions of prejudice. 
Study 1 manipulated information about the  harm caused by a White actor to a Black target (no 
harm, ambiguous harm, clear harm). Study 2 manipulated information about a White actor’s 
intent to racially discriminate against a Black target (no intent, ambiguous intent, clear intent). 
Across both studies, evidence supported the conclusion that attributions of prejudice are related 
to observers’ beliefs and expectations about racial prejudice when they are given ambiguous 
information about harm and intent. Understanding when differences in observers’ propensity to 
make attributions to prejudice might influence their attributions will contribute to our 
understanding of when expressions of prejudice are perceived, and more generally about how 
and when beliefs influence how individuals interpret their social world. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Prejudice and discrimination based on perceived racial group membership are unfortunate 
social realities. According to contemporary theories of prejudice (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 
2000; Dowden & Robinson, 1993), the development of social norms that condemn overt 
expressions of prejudice toward certain racial groups (e.g., Blacks; Crandall, Eshleman, & 
O’Brien, 2002) may have lead to a reduction in blatant expressions of racism. Although these 
developments certainly could be considered progress toward eliminating racism, prejudice 
(defined as a negative evaluation of a social group; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) remains at a 
more implicit, often unconscious level (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). As such, expressions 
of racial prejudice are often more subtle, ambiguous, or justified in ways that decrease the 
likelihood that individuals will be perceived as racist, which may thus in turn function to protect 
individuals’ beliefs that they are without prejudice (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio, 
2001; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988; McConahay, 1986; Pearson, Dovidio, & 
Gaertner, 2009). For example, racial discrimination (a behavioral manifestation of prejudice) 
tends to increase when there are alternative, race-neutral explanations for a behavior (e.g., 
Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Saucier & Miller, 2003; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005). Such 
ambiguity may make it difficult for individuals to recognize and identify instances of racial 
prejudice.  
Furthermore, individuals’ attempts at impression management (e.g., avoiding being 
perceived as racist) may add to the ambiguity surrounding others’ judgments of an actor’s 
behavior. According to Major and Sawyer (2009), a judgment that prejudice has been expressed 
involves two essential components: 1) “a judgment that treatment was based on social identity or 
group membership” and 2) “a judgment that the treatment was unjust or underserved” (p. 90). 
Uncertainty regarding either of these judgments may lead individuals to alternative 
interpretations that do not involve labeling the actor, or the actor’s behavior, as prejudiced. 
Because of the normative pressures that condemn acts of racial prejudice toward some groups of 
racial minorities (e.g., Blacks; Crandall et al., 2002), actors are likely to attempt to manage 
others’ impressions regarding either one of these factors (e.g., by offering alternative 
justifications; cf., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) in order to avoid being perceived as prejudiced.  
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Just as individuals may attempt to cover their racial biases, representations of prejudice in 
American culture (e.g., media) may work to conceal more subtle expressions of prejudice. There 
appears to be a general consensus that racism is limited to blatant expressions (e.g., hate crimes, 
the espoused beliefs of White supremacist groups), and this conceptualization of prejudice 
allows people to believe that they are relatively unprejudiced (O’Brien et al., 2010). This 
conclusion is consistent with research by Sommers and Norton (2006) that suggests that blatant, 
“old-fashioned” forms of racism are the prototype (Inman & Baron, 1996; Marti, Bobier, & 
Baron, 2000) for lay conceptualizations of what constitutes racism. Lay theories about racism 
may act as a cognitive tool for understanding racism as well as serving a motivational function in 
distancing oneself from being perceived as racist. These theories suggest that although 
individuals may agree in their perceptions of prejudice when it is more blatantly expressed, 
disagreements may occur in judgments about more subtle expressions of racial prejudice. 
In short, contemporary expressions of prejudice are constructed in ways that are difficult 
for others to perceive. Given the ambiguity that surrounds contemporary expressions of 
prejudice, observers’ judgments about whether prejudice has been expressed are influenced by a 
variety of factors related to the situation and characteristics of the individual perceiver. 
Accordingly, theories of attribution, motivated cognition, and racial prejudice, suggest that 
individuals will differ in terms of the likelihood that they will perceive prejudice in situations 
where prejudice is ambiguously expressed. Ambiguity leaves room for variation in how 
individuals interpret events. The major premise of the current thesis is that whether observers 
make attributions to prejudice depends on the situational cues as well as observers’ beliefs and 
expectations regarding racial prejudice and discrimination. The present research examines how 
individual differences in the tendency to make attributions to prejudice (Miller, Culbertson, 
Hockett, & Saucier, 2013; Miller, Hockett, O’Dea, Till, & Saucier, 2014; Miller, Hockett, & 
Saucier, manuscript in preparation) contribute to variation in judgments of prejudice across a 
range of situational ambiguity.  
Recently, Miller and colleagues (Miller et al., 2013), developed the Propensity to Make 
Attributions to Prejudice Scale (PMAPS). The authors designed the PMAPS to measure 
individual differences in beliefs and expectations regarding racial prejudice that will predict 
variation in observers’ attributions to prejudice, especially in situations of ambiguity and 
uncertainty. In previous studies, the PMAPS was shown to exhibit good psychometric properties 
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(e.g., internal consistency, convergent validity). The present research was designed to further 
examine the predictive validity of the PMAPS, as well as test whether the tendency to make 
attributions to prejudice is moderated by the effects of different situational cues that prior theory 
and research suggest influence attributions to prejudice (e.g., Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, & 
Stangor, 2003).  
To better understand when observers might make attributions to prejudice, it is necessary 
to review and understand the various psychological factors that might influence the tendency to 
make attributions to prejudice. The majority of research addressing the question of when people 
make attributions to prejudice has focused on the attributions made by typical targets of 
prejudice and discrimination (e.g., racial minorities, women), and with a few exceptions, little 
research examines when attributions are made by third party observers. In the following sections, 
I draw insights from theory and research on targets’ attributions to prejudice and discuss how 
this knowledge may apply to our understanding of observers’ tendencies to make attributions of 
prejudice. 
 Factors Influencing Judgments of Prejudice 
Understanding the factors that affect judgments of prejudice is of theoretical and practical 
interest. Prejudice is an attitude that is sometimes explicit, but often implicit (i.e., individuals are 
unaware of their prejudices; e.g., Banaji & Dasgupta, 1998; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), and 
although blatant expressions of prejudice are typically socially unacceptable, subtle forms of 
prejudice are more pervasive, perhaps precisely because they are harder for others to detect as 
being prejudiced (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Because of the ambiguity that surrounds subtle 
expressions of prejudice and the subjective nature of attributional processes, judgments of 
prejudice are susceptible to human error (e.g., perceiving prejudice where none exists, or not 
perceiving prejudice when it does exist). Such errors can have negative societal and interpersonal 
consequences. For example, allowing prejudice to go unnoticed and unchallenged may promote a 
climate of intolerance and racial hostility. Yet mistakenly perceiving prejudice unfairly 
condemns others and their actions. To understand how these mistakes are made, it is important to 
understand the psychological factors that influence judgments of prejudice. 
Judgments about expressions of prejudice have been shown in previous research to be 
influenced by a variety of person characteristics and environmental factors that may function to 
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bias individuals toward perceiving prejudice, or not perceiving prejudice. The majority of this 
research has focused on individual differences in the tendency to make attributions to prejudice 
and discrimination from the targets’ perspective (for reviews, see Barrett & Swim, 1998; Kaiser 
& Major, 2006; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Major & Sawyer, 2009), and only a small 
amount of research has been done to examine how third-party observers perceive prejudice (e.g., 
Inman & Baron, 1996; Marti, Bobier, & Baron, 2000; Swim et al., 2003). Although observers are 
typically less personally affected by potentially prejudiced behavior than are targets, observers 
and targets are both making judgments under uncertainty about the underlying causes for others’ 
behaviors. Thus, by examining what we already know about targets’ attributions to prejudice we 
can more fully understand the processes involved and gain insight into how observers form these 
judgments. The following review of the literature serves to describe the domain of social 
psychology in which the present research makes its contribution, and to pose unanswered 
questions and offer hypotheses about bystanders’ attributions to prejudice that will define my 
program of research. 
To understand how observers make judgments about whether prejudice has been 
expressed, it is necessary to understand why individuals might label someone or some action as 
prejudiced. Attributions to prejudice may function to provide causal explanations for observed 
behaviors (Major & Sawyer, 2009; Malle, 2004). Beyond satisfying a basic need for 
understanding another’s behaviors, a multitude of social goals, discussed in the sections that 
follow, may be satisfied by making attributions to prejudice. In part, individuals may make 
attributions to prejudice (or to other causes) in order to protect their self-esteem, to manage 
others’ impressions, or to be accepted by others. As such, whether prejudice is used as an 
explanation for others’ behaviors can at times be understood as a special case of motivated 
cognition (e.g., Baumeister, 1996; Fiske, 2004; Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Spencer, 2003) that is 
driven by concerns about the self. 
 Motivated Cognition 
Attributing one’s negative outcomes (e.g., social rejection, being passed over for a 
promotion) to the prejudice of others may be self-protective (Allport, 1954). In cases where the 
achievement of some desired goal (e.g., obtaining employment or a promotion) depends on the 
judgment of another individual (e.g., an employer), making an external attribution for the failure 
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to reach that goal may reduce self-blame. Research on targets’ attributions to prejudice supports 
this idea that in certain situations, attributions to prejudice can protect self-esteem. Several 
studies have found that when individuals who identify with a group that is chronically targeted 
by prejudice and discrimination (e.g., women, Blacks) attribute a negative evaluation to the 
prejudice of the evaluator, their self-evaluations are more positive than individuals who do not 
attribute their outcomes to prejudice (e.g., Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003; Major, Kaiser, 
O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003; Wang, Stroebe, & Dovidio, 
2012). This self-protective motivation is arguably not a factor in observers’ attributions, however 
observers may take on the perspective of the target and empathize with his or her negative 
outcomes. Thus, individual differences in empathetic concern and perspective taking may be 
related to whether or not observers make attributions to prejudice. Indeed, the PMAPS has been 
found to be related to these individual differences (Miller et al., 2013). 
Although protecting self-esteem by making attributions to prejudice may increase the 
tendency to perceive prejudice, other self-protective concerns may lead to a tendency to discount 
prejudice as an explanation. For example, claiming discrimination can have negative social costs 
for the accuser (e.g., stigmatized individuals who make attributions to discrimination are often 
disparaged). Therefore, stigmatized individuals may be motivated to avoid the social costs of 
publically claiming that discrimination has occurred, and thus may minimize the extent to which 
they perceive prejudice (Kaiser, 2006; Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Hagiwara, 2006; Kaiser & Miller, 
2001). Applying similar logic, it is also possible, although the confirming research is absent, that 
higher status, non-stigmatized bystanders may believe that they would risk disapproval from 
other ingroup members if they were to make it known that they believed that an actor behaved 
with prejudice. Thus, the motivation to be accepted by others and avoid social retributions may 
lead both targets and observers to discount prejudice as an explanation. 
However, the need for social acceptance and belongingness (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 
1995) may heighten or minimize attributions to prejudice depending on the group membership of 
the perceiver and the social group from which one seeks social approval. As already alluded to, 
because attributions to prejudice are morally condemning toward the actor and the actor’s social 
group, and as such may be perceived as antagonistic, stigmatized individuals’ desires to be 
accepted by members of a higher status group may function to minimize perceptions that they 
have been the target of prejudicial treatment (Carvallo & Pelham, 2006). A similar motivation 
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for acceptance from one’s own stigmatized group may increase the tendency to perceive 
prejudice toward members of stigmatized groups (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2012; Operario & 
Fiske, 2001) in that sharing the experience of stigma may be a form of social affiliation with 
others who may identify with a stigmatized group. Likewise, if non-stigmatized individuals 
desire to be accepted by a stigmatized group, they as bystanders may intervene and express their 
condemnation of prejudice as a way to demonstrate a prosocial orientation (e.g., empathy) 
toward the group. Such motivations may lead observers to have a stronger tendency to make 
attributions to prejudice. 
Consistent with this idea that voicing one’s attributions to prejudice may be a form of 
impression management, existing research has examined the types of expressions of prejudice 
that are more likely to be identified as prejudiced by observers. For example, when individuals 
who belong to groups that are prototypical perpetrators of prejudice (e.g., White males; Inman & 
Baron, 1996) condemn others’ blatant expressions of racism (e.g., racial slurs), such individuals 
may believe that they are distancing themselves (e.g., O’Brien et al., 2010) from being perceived 
as racist (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001). Thus, blatant forms of prejudice are more likely to be 
perceived and their existence agreed upon. However, it is also reasonable to assume that when 
prejudice is more subtly expressed, perhaps in ways that perceivers can imagine themselves 
behaving, individuals may deny that such behaviors are expressions of prejudice in order to 
avoid conceptualizing more subtle expressions of bias as prejudice, and thus possibly avoid 
having others perceive their own similar actions as prejudiced.  
Impression management concerns may also function to increase the tendency to label 
other social groups, or individuals belonging to these groups, as prejudiced. For example, people 
may use attributions to prejudice as a form of moral condemnation that serves to convey the 
impression that oneself or one’s social group is morally superior to other individuals or social 
groups (e.g., liberals who claim that conservatives are more likely to be racist). This self-serving 
expression of moral condemnation may be a way of attempting to persuade others that they 
should side with one’s own social group (e.g., DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013), although this 
hypothesis has yet to be studied directly in relation to prejudice. Furthermore, observers who are 
more concerned about suppressing their own prejudiced thoughts and behaviors because it is 
important to their self-concept (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998), may be more likely to make 
attributions of prejudice to others in order to condemn such behavior. Prior research has found 
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that the PMAPS is related to such internal motivations to suppress prejudice, such that 
individuals who may be more likely to make attributions to prejudice also have higher internal 
motivations to respond without prejudice (Miller et al., 2013). 
In summary, different situations that activate different self-concerns (e.g., social 
acceptance) may motivate attributions to prejudice, or alternatively, attributions to non-
prejudiced causes, depending on the salient concerns of the perceiver. Because of the subjective 
and motivational nature of these social judgments, it is also necessary to understand how 
attributions to prejudice are affected by the combination of situational factors and enduring 
differences between individuals (e.g., identity, social attitudes). The following discussion focuses 
on how person x situation interactions (Allport, 1937, 1954; Lewin, 1935) further influences 
perceptions of prejudice. 
 Individual Differences in Attributions to Prejudice 
The overarching question addressed in the present research is whether individual 
differences in beliefs and expectations regarding racial prejudice affect the probability that they 
will attribute prejudice as the cause of ambiguously discriminatory behaviors (e.g., Kaiser & 
Major, 2006; Pinel, 1999). Research related to this question suggests that individual differences 
tend to have a stronger effect on individuals’ appraisals in situations of higher ambiguity, or 
when discriminatory behaviors are more subtle (e.g., Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003; 
Operario & Fiske, 2001), which is often the case when prejudice is expressed. The following 
discussion first introduces and briefly summarizes the research and theory on how individual 
differences affect targets’ perceptions of prejudice and then extends this research by constructing 
several theoretical propositions about the individual differences that might be relevant for 
understanding factors that influence bystanders’, and in particular, members of socially dominant 
groups (e.g., Whites), attributions to prejudice. 
 Target characteristics  
Psychologists have mostly limited their study of individual differences in attributions to 
prejudice to the target’s perspective. Researchers have focused on how individual differences in 
constructs such as social identity, foundational belief systems (i.e., worldviews), and 
expectations to be treated stereotypically, work to suppress or facilitate the perception that one 
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has been the target of prejudice or discrimination (for reviews see Barrett & Swim, 1998; Kaiser, 
2006; Kaiser & Major, 2006, Major et al., 2002; Major & Sawyer, 2009). 
 Social identity 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), individuals may vary in 
terms of how much personal meaning they derive from their social group memberships, and to 
what degree their group-level identities shape their cognitive interpretations of the social world. 
One interesting prediction of this theory is that the increased importance of individuals’ social 
group to their self-concept increases the likelihood that social interactions with outgoup members 
will be interpreted through the lens of their group identities.  Major, Quinton, and Schmader 
(2003) extended this theory to predict that more strongly identifying with a stigmatized group 
will increase perceptions that one has been the target of group-based discrimination. In other 
words, stronger group identification was hypothesized to increase the tendency for stigmatized 
individuals to attribute others’ ambiguously prejudiced behaviors to group-level causes (e.g., 
being a member of a stigmatized social group), rather than an individual-level causes (e.g., their 
own idiosyncratic behaviors). Consistent with this theory, Major et al. (2003) found that, after 
receiving negative feedback, women who more strongly identified with their gender group (i.e., 
for whom being a woman was a more important element of their social identity) were more 
likely to make attributions to discrimination when prejudice cues were ambiguous. Similar 
studies have found that racial minorities who more highly identify with their racial group are 
more likely to interpret subtle, or ambiguous, prejudice cues (e.g., avoiding eye contact) as 
expressions of prejudice (e.g., Operario & Fiske, 2001), as well as more likely to believe that 
they have been the target of prejudice and discrimination in the past (e.g., Eccleston & Major, 
2006; Sellers & Shelton, 2003).  
 Worldviews 
Individuals’ foundational beliefs (i.e., the ways in which people interpret and understand 
their social world) also appear to influence judgments of prejudice. Particular attention has been 
given to individuals’ meritocratic worldviews (e.g. Jost et al., 2004; Lerner, 1980), defined as the 
belief that people are individually responsible for their own successes or failures. In other words, 
according the meritocratic worldview, achievement (e.g., academics, career success, 
socioeconomic mobility) is based primarily on individual merit. When confronted with evidence 
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of racial inequality, individuals who more strongly endorse a meritocratic worldview tend to 
attribute negative characteristics to lower status racial groups to explain those inequalities 
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).  
In addition to justifying prejudice toward lower status groups this meritocratic worldview 
may also influence whether or not stigmatized individuals believe that they have been targets of 
discrimination and prejudice. Believing that one has been treated unfairly may threaten one’s 
beliefs that the world is just and fair. To avoid the discomfort associated with this dissonance, 
individuals may minimize the extent to which they perceive discrimination and prejudice. 
Indeed, multiple studies have found that more strongly endorsing a meritocratic worldview may 
lead lower-status (or chronic) targets of discrimination to fail to perceive instances of 
discrimination because it threatens their belief in meritocracy (Kaiser, 2006; Kaiser et al., 2006; 
Kaiser & Major, 2006; Major et al., 2002). Additionally, perceiving discrimination toward their 
ingroup may have negative effects on self-esteem for individuals who more strongly endorse a 
meritocratic worldview (Major et al., 2007). However, a meritocratic worldview may lead 
Whites to perceive reverse discrimination in reaction to affirmative action policies, while 
simultaneously contributing to a denial of racial discrimination committed by Whites (Kaiser, 
2006). The evidence so far appears to support the proposition that, for targets of prejudice, a 
meritocratic world view is associated with a tendency to discount prejudice as an explanation for 
racial inequality. It seems reasonable to assume that this worldview would similarly predict 
attributions to prejudice made by bystanders, although this remains to be empirically confirmed. 
 Stigma consciousness 
Related to social identity, but perhaps a more proximal factor influencing targets’ 
judgments of prejudice may be their expectations to be mistreated because of their membership 
in a stigmatized social group, a concept Pinel (1999) termed stigma consciousness. Much of the 
work on stigma consciousness in relation to attributions to prejudice has focused on women as a 
stigmatized, lower power social group (e.g., Brown & Pinel, 2003; Pinel, 2002; Pinel, Warner, & 
Chua, 2005; Pinel & Paulin, 2005; Wang et al., 2012). Women’s expectations to be treated 
stereotypically have been shown to predict quicker reaction times in perceiving facial 
expressions of male contempt (Inzlicht, Kaiser, & Major, 2008) and attentional vigilance toward 
subliminal cues (sexist words presented at preconscious speed) related to sexism (Kaiser, Vick, 
& Major, 2006). These findings demonstrate that for women, the expectation to be treated 
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prejudicially is related to heightened sensitivity to indicators of prejudice. Consistent with the 
evidence that a higher expectation to be treated stereotypically is related to a tendency to favor 
prejudice as an explanation for ambiguously discriminatory behaviors, I propose (and further 
discuss below) that differences in bystanders’ expectations that others behave prejudicially 
toward stigmatized individuals will similarly predict observers’ tendency to make attributions to 
prejudice. 
In summary, it appears that differences in targets’ meritocratic worldviews, expectations 
to be treated stereotypically, and social identities are important factors influencing attributions to 
prejudice. Yet, compared to the literature on targets’ attributions to prejudice, little research has 
been done to examine how individual differences may affect third party observers’ (i.e., 
bystanders’) attributions to prejudice.  
 Observer characteristics 
Consistent with attribution theory (e.g., Kelly & Michela, 1980) and research on stigma 
consciousness, which make the assertion that prior beliefs influence the attributions people make, 
possible sources of individual variation in the tendency to make attributions to prejudice may be 
observers’ expectations for, and vigilance toward, expressions of prejudice. From the theoretical 
perspective of Signal Detection Theory, these prior beliefs and expectations are hypothesized to 
affect individuals’ thresholds for detecting prejudice given the presence or absences of various 
cues for prejudice (e.g., the actors’ intent to racially discriminate, perceived harm done to the 
target) that may or may not be present in a given situation (e.g., Barrett & Swim, 1998). For 
example, observers who expect to see prejudice and are more vigilant in attending to potential 
signals of prejudice may have a lower threshold for detecting prejudice and thus be more likely 
to interpret others’ behaviors as expressions of prejudice. Alternatively, observers who think that 
prejudice is uncommon and who rarely think about it or look for it may have a higher threshold 
for detecting prejudice and thus be less likely to see prejudice when it is expressed. In short, I 
propose that individuals’ prior beliefs about prejudice (e.g., about the prevalence of prejudice) 
and behavioral tendencies (e.g., vigilance toward indicators of prejudice) toward detecting 
prejudice, will predict individuals’ attributions to prejudice in situations where prejudice may 
prototypically be expressed (e.g., an interracial interaction between a White and Black 
individual; Inman & Baron, 1996). 
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 The Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice Scale 
To test the hypothesis that individuals’ prior beliefs and expectations related to 
expressions of prejudice will predict attributions to prejudice in situations where prejudice may 
be expressed, Miller and colleagues (2013), designed a measure of individual differences in 
observers’ tendencies to make attributions to prejudice: the Propensity to Make Attributions to 
Prejudice Scale (PMAPS). In contrast to existing measures of targets’ expectations to be treated 
stereotypically, the PMAPS items are worded to measure third-party observers’ attitudes. This 
allows researchers to measure the attitudes of members of social groups who are prototypically 
the perpetrators of racial discrimination (e.g., Whites), and thus may be used to further our 
understanding of how and when prejudice is perceived by dominant group members. The 
PMAPS expands upon existing measures of expectations for prejudicial treatment (e.g., Pinel, 
1999) to include additional, theoretically related constructs. Specifically, the PMAPS was 
designed to measure four related dimensions of a tendency to make attributions to prejudice 
(described in more detail below) conceptualized as: 1) expectation, or perceptions of the 
pervasiveness of racial prejudice (i.e., beliefs about the base-rates for prejudice); 2) vigilance in 
spotting instances of prejudice; 3) trivialization of targets’ claims and concerns about being 
treated prejudicially; and 4) self-efficacy, or self-confidence in recognizing instances of prejudice 
(see Appendix A for scale items). In combination, these constructs were hypothesized to underlie 
individuals’ tendencies to make attributions to prejudice. 
 Expectation 
The first dimension that I propose is relevant to observers’ tendencies to make 
attributions to prejudice is their expectations for prejudice. Bystanders may have different 
expectations for others’ behaviors related to their beliefs about the prevalence of racial prejudice. 
Expectations for prejudice may be especially important when prejudice cues are subtle, or 
alternative race-neutral explanations are available. Such ambiguity may invite top-down 
processing effects described by theories of confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), and biased 
assimilation (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). These top-down processes are known to affect how 
individuals attend to, interpret, and weigh available information in forming their attributions. 
Individuals who believe that racial prejudice is more widespread (i.e., higher base-rates, Barrett 
& Swim, 1998) may be more likely to perceive prejudice in situations where prejudice has the 
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potential to be expressed by others (e.g., witnessing an interracial interaction). Conversely, 
individuals who think that prejudice is uncommon, or rare, may fail to consider prejudice as a 
possible explanation. In each case, there is a tendency to perceive prejudice (or not) that is 
consistent with prior beliefs. Therefore, expectations about prejudice should be an important 
factor in predicting individuals’ propensity to make attributions to prejudice. 
 Vigilance 
In addition to higher expectations for prejudice, the second dimension of the PMAPS is 
vigilance. Individuals who are more vigilant for environmental cues that may indicate racial 
prejudice may be more likely to see prejudice in their social world (e.g., Inzlicht et al., 2008). 
For chronic targets of prejudice, vigilance for cues that they have been subjected to prejudice or 
discrimination may be adaptive (Major & Sawyer, 2009) in that attributing one’s negative 
outcomes to the prejudice of others can protect self-esteem. Although the motivation for 
vigilance may be less obvious for observers, higher levels of vigilance are likely to result in a 
greater sensitivity (and over-sensitivity) to signs of prejudice (Barrett & Swim, 1998). Therefore, 
variation in bystanders’ vigilance for cues of prejudice may predict variation in their attributions 
to prejudice. 
 Trivialization 
Individuals who are more likely to expect prejudice and are more vigilant in seeking out 
indicators for prejudice may also be less likely to trivialize targets’ concerns about being 
discriminated against or treated stereotypically because of their racial group membership. This 
third dimension, trivialization, is defined as the belief that racial minorities too often unfairly 
claim that they are the targets of prejudice and discrimination (e.g., modern racism; McConahay, 
1986). While this construct is antithetical to higher expectations for prejudice, a tendency toward 
trivialization may operate through similar processes of confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). 
Members of the racial majority (e.g., Whites) may be motivated to trivialize the impact of 
prejudice as a way of justifying negative or ambivalent attitudes toward racial minorities (e.g., 
Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Katz & Hass, 1988; McConahay, 1986), or to legitimize their 
higher social standing (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) by denying that racial 
discrimination occurs. Trivialization should therefore be related to a lower tendency to make 
attributions to prejudice. 
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 Self-Efficacy 
After accounting for individuals’ tendencies to expect prejudice, be vigilant in looking 
out for it, and not trivialize targets’ concerns about suffering discrimination, it is also important 
to consider whether people will feel confident in reporting their attributions to prejudice. Thus, 
the fourth dimension of the PMAPS is individuals’ self-efficacy in their ability to recognize 
instances of racial prejudice and discrimination. If individuals are not confident in their 
judgments, they are unlikely to report them. Thus, in combination with expectations, vigilance, 
and trivialization, self-efficacy should be related to a higher tendency to make attributions to 
prejudice. 
 Empirical Assessment of the PMAPS 
Initial assessment of the psychometric properties of the scale (Miller et al., 2013) has 
revealed that the PMAPS demonstrates acceptable reliability and meaningful relationships with 
other theoretically relevant psychological constructs. Importantly, the higher order construct of 
the tendency to make attributions to prejudice as measured by the PMAPS has been found to be 
related to other, theoretically related individual differences. As previously discussed, an 
important characteristic of contemporary forms of prejudice is the denial that prejudice exists in 
today’s society (e.g., Dovidio, 2001; McConahay, 1986). Therefore, individuals who are more 
likely to hold prejudices toward stigmatized groups (e.g., racial minorities) should be less likely 
to make attributions to prejudice. This hypothesis was supported in research by Miller and 
colleagues (2013) who found that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice was related in 
predictable ways to several individual differences that are theoretically considered to justify 
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), or cause (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; McFarland, 2010), racial 
prejudice.  
For example, a lower tendency to make attributions to prejudice as measured by the 
PMAPS was found to be related to higher levels of modern racism (McConahay, 1986), or 
beliefs that racial prejudice and discrimination are no longer a problem (Miller et al. 2013). 
Additionally a lower tendency to make attributions to prejudice was found to predict higher 
levels of social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), and right-wing authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1988). These two worldviews appear to justify prejudice toward lower status and 
threatening groups, such as racial minorities (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 
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2007; McFarland, 2010). Thus, a lower tendency to make attributions to prejudice by observers 
appears to be related to system justifying beliefs and a denial of racial prejudice, and these 
findings are consistent with findings that whether or not targets of prejudice make attributions to 
prejudice and discrimination is related to their system justifying ideologies (Kaiser, 2006; Kaiser 
et al., 2006; Kaiser & Major, 2006; Major et al., 2002, 2007). 
Additionally, Miller and colleagues (2013) found that the tendency to make attributions 
predicts individual differences in the tendency to suppress expressions of prejudice (Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003). For example, the PMAPS was found to positively correlate with measures of 
empathy and perspective taking (e.g., Davis, 1980; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Hoffman, 
1990; Stephan & Finlay, 1999), suggesting that a higher tendency to make attributions to 
prejudice may be related to a higher level of empathy for the targets of racial prejudice and 
discrimination. Also, a higher tendency to make attributions to prejudice predicted stronger 
support for humanitarian and egalitarian beliefs (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988; Monteith & Walters, 
1998), and internal motivations to suppress prejudice (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998, 2009). This is 
compelling evidence that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice is positively related to a 
network of beliefs that, in general, prejudice is wrong and should be eradicated.   
In addition to finding that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice is related to 
individual differences in beliefs that justify or suppress expressions of prejudice, Miller and 
colleagues (2014) also found that this tendency predicts attributions to prejudice in specific 
scenarios. Consistent with attribution theory and research on targets’ attributions to prejudice, 
Miller and colleagues (2014) found that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice predicted 
attributions to prejudice when individuals were presented with brief scenarios describing 
antisocial behavior by Whites directed at racial minorities (e.g., Blacks, Hispanics, Arabs). The 
three scenario sets differed in terms of the ambiguity in which prejudice was expressed. The low 
ambiguity, non-prejudice scenarios all contained a race-neutral explanation for the actors’ 
behaviors (e.g., A White driver flips off a Black driver for driving dangerously in traffic). In other 
words, the scenarios in the non-prejudice condition described the actor’s behavior as being 
motivated by situational factors that had nothing to do with the target’s race. In the ambiguous 
prejudice condition, no explanations were given for the actor’s behavior (e.g., A White sales 
associate keeps a close eye on a Black customer). In the blatant prejudice condition, the 
scenarios described a more obvious expression of prejudice (e.g., A White individual shouts “Go 
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back to Mexico” at a group of Hispanics at a civil rights protest). As predicted, the correlation 
between the PMAPS and judgments of prejudice was highest in the ambiguous condition (r = 
.73, p < .001), while only weakly correlated in the blatant condition (r = .25, p = .20). 
Interestingly, the PMAPS also predicted judgments of prejudice in the non-prejudice condition (r 
= .60, p < .001), suggesting that a stronger tendency to make attributions to prejudice may be 
related to a tendency to discount alternative explanations for antisocial behavior perpetrated by 
Whites toward racial minorities. This pattern of effects suggests that there is less individual 
variability in attributions to prejudice when prejudice is expressed more blatantly. However, 
when there is a lack of information about the reasons for an actor’s behavior, or even when non-
prejudiced reasons are available, individual differences in the tendency to perceive prejudice 
may play a larger role in whether attributions to prejudice are made. 
In summary, the evidence collected so far supports the reliability and validity of the 
PMAPS, and demonstrates how the tendency to make attributions to prejudice are related to 
individual differences in beliefs that justify or suppress expressions of prejudice. In the current 
research, I further tested the validity of the measure, but more importantly, I more systematically 
assessed whether the tendency to make attributions to prejudice is moderated by the effects of 
situational information that influences attributions to prejudice so that we can better understand 
factors that affect whether or not prejudice is perceived in our social world. 
 The Present Research 
For the present set of studies, I manipulated characteristics of the situation and assessed 
whether the tendency to make attributions to prejudice interacts with informational cues that are 
known to affect judgments of prejudice (e.g., information about an actor’s intent and information 
about the harm caused to the target; Swim et al., 2003). In other words, contextual information 
that generally supports or contradicts attributions to prejudice may override the effects of a 
general tendency to make attributions to prejudice. For example, when information about an 
actor’s intent suggests that the actor intended to racially discriminate, the tendency to make 
attributions to prejudice may have less of an affect on observers’ attributions to prejudice 
because the cues signaling that prejudice has been expressed will have surpassed many 
observers’ thresholds for making an attribution to prejudice . Similarly, when information 
suggests that no harm came to the target, individuals are less likely to attribute prejudice to the 
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actor (Swim et al., 2003), and this effect may attenuate the effects of a tendency to make 
attributions to prejudice because the available information signals that prejudice has not been 
expressed and therefore many observers’ thresholds for making an attribution to prejudice will 
not be reached. However, when expressions of prejudice are more ambiguous (e.g., when 
information about harm and intent are unavailable), a tendency to make attributions to prejudice 
should have more of an effect on attributions to prejudice in these situations because differences 
in individuals’ thresholds for making attributions to prejudice (as measured by the PMAPS) will 
be more predictive of whether or not individuals make attributions to prejudice in ambiguous 
situations. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two studies in which I manipulated information 
about the harm done to the target (Study 1) and information about an actor’s intent to racially 
discriminate (Study 2) and assessed whether the PMAPS interacted with different levels of 
information about harm and intent in predicting attributions to prejudice. 
 The Role of Intent and Harm in Judgments of Prejudice 
Intent is understood by psychologists as a conscious mental state that precedes deliberate 
action, or leads to a decision among alternative choices (Malle, 1999, 2004). Social 
psychologists who study processes involved in stereotyping and prejudice understand that intent 
is not always necessary to motivate expressions of prejudice. For example, when group 
membership is salient, as it is in the case of visual features (e.g., skin color) that are used to 
categorize individuals on into racial groups, culturally constructed stereotypes are automatically 
activated (e.g., Devine, 1989; Kunda & Spencer, 2003). Thus, in some situations that prevent 
controlled, intentional suppression of stereotype application or that may cause individuals to 
interpret their behavior as unbiased, people are more likely to behave consistent with their true 
levels of prejudice (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997). In 
these situations, individuals may not even be aware of the real reasons for their discriminatory 
behavior, and thus cannot be understood to intentionally discriminate. However, when intent to 
express prejudice is present, there may be little doubt about an actor’s prejudice (Swim et al., 
2003). 
Information about intent may be important because, for the lay observer, accusations of 
prejudice have social costs for the accuser (e.g., Kaiser & Miller, 2001). Similarly, labeling 
someone as a racist is morally condemning and will likely entail social costs for the accused, 
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which in some situations risks retaliatory actions. Thus, because individuals may perceive 
labeling someone as prejudiced (e.g., racist) as a risky behavior, people may be more reluctant, 
or require a greater degree of supporting evidence before making attributions to prejudice 
compared to attributions to race-unrelated causes. Information about an actor’s intent may allow 
individuals to justify their judgments, convince others that they have made a correct judgment, 
and appeal to the normative rules guiding expressions of prejudice in order to minimize the 
social costs that they may incur for making such judgments. Swim and colleagues (2003) found 
evidence across multiple studies that information about an actor’s intent to express prejudice 
affects observers’ attributions to prejudice, such that attributions to prejudice were most likely 
when information more clearly suggested that the actor intended to express prejudice. 
However, the intention behind an actor’s behavior is difficult to judge because observers 
do not have access to the actors’ internal mental states (Malle, 1999, 2004). Even when actors 
provide an account of the reasons for their behavior, they may not be believed, especially when 
they appear to be managing others’ perceptions by offering race-irrelevant justifications for 
behaviors that could be interpreted as evidence of prejudice. Alternatively, if actors were to 
unambiguously reveal their intent to discriminate, observers should be much more certain in their 
judgments of the actors’ prejudice. Given the uncertainty that likely surrounds judgments of 
intent, individual differences in the tendency to perceive prejudice may interact with information 
about intent in influencing observers’ attributions to prejudice. Specifically, when the actor’s 
intent is more ambiguous (e.g., when there is no information about an actor’s intent to express 
prejudice), the tendency to make attributions to prejudice should have a stronger effect on 
observers’ interpretations of the actor and his or her behavior compared to when information 
about an actor’s intent is less ambiguous (e.g., the available information more clearly suggests 
that the actor did or did not intend to express prejudice). The present research was designed to 
assess whether the tendency to make attributions to prejudice is moderated by the effects of 
information about intent on attributions to prejudice.  
In the absence of information about intent, the amount of harm experienced by targets of 
prejudice appears to influence whether individuals make attributions to prejudice and 
discrimination. Swim and colleagues (2003) found that when intent was ambiguous, information 
that indicated higher levels of harm done to the target resulted in higher levels of perceived 
prejudice. I propose that the effects of information about harm also moderate individuals’ prior 
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tendencies to make attributions to prejudice, such that individuals who have a higher tendency to 
make attributions to prejudice will more likely see prejudice in situations where information 
about harm is unavailable or ambiguous, compared to situations where information about harm is 
provided. 
 Summary of Hypotheses 
One goal of the present research was to further assess the predictive validity of the 
PMAPS. If the PMAPS is indeed measuring individual differences in the propensity to judge 
others as prejudiced, then this measure should predict attributions to prejudice. Therefore, my 
first hypothesis is that the PMAPS will predict attributions to prejudice. Specifically, the present 
studies assessed whether individual differences in the tendency to make attributions to prejudice, 
as measured by the PMAPS, predict attributions to prejudice in situations where prejudice might 
be expressed (e.g., an interaction between a White and Black individual). The second goal of the 
present research was to assess whether information about harm and intent moderates a tendency 
to make attributions to prejudice. My second hypothesis is that the tendency to make attributions 
to prejudice will be a stronger predictor of attributions to prejudice in situations where 
information about harm and intent are most ambiguous. The present research tested these 
hypotheses in the studies described below where the interactions between the PMAPS and 
manipulated information about harm (Study 1) and intent (Study 2) were assessed for their 
effects on individuals’ attributions to prejudice in situations where prejudice may potentially be 
expressed (e.g., an interracial interaction). 
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Chapter 2 - Study 1 
In Study 1, information about harm was experimentally manipulated in order to assess 
whether the effects of the PMAPS on attributions to prejudice are moderated by information that 
conveys varying levels of harm done to a target in a situation where racial prejudice may 
potentially be expressed. Specifically, participants were presented with scenario in which a 
White landlord declined the rental application of a Black student. Three different story endings 
given to three different groups of participants were used to manipulate information about the 
level of harm (e.g., no harm, ambiguous harm, and clear harm conditions). Based on the findings 
by Swim et al. (2003) suggesting that individuals’ judgments of prejudice are influenced by the 
level of harm done to the target, I predicted a main effect for level of harm, such that attributions 
to prejudice would be more likely when observers are given information that suggests that the 
target was harmed by the actor’s behavior (i.e., in the clear harm condition). Additionally, I 
predicted a main effect for the PMAPS, such that it would be positively related to the perceived 
likelihood that the actor in the story was prejudiced regardless of information about harm. 
Finally, and more central to the hypothesis that information about harm moderates the 
relationship between the tendency to make attributions to prejudice and attributions of prejudice 
within the situation, I predicted an interaction between the level of harm and the PMAPS, such 
that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice would be a stronger predictor of attributions 
to prejudice when information about harm was ambiguous (i.e., not provided in the ambiguous 
harm condition) than when information about harm was provided (i.e., in the no harm and clear 
harm conditions). 
In addition to assessing how the tendency to make attributions to prejudice is moderated 
by the effects of information about harm on attributions of prejudice, I also addressed an 
exploratory question in Study 1. Swim and colleagues (2003) found that observers were more 
likely to label a behavior as prejudiced than to make a judgment about the actor’s dispositional 
prejudice. By asking individuals to make judgments about both the actor and the actor’s 
behavior, I assessed whether the PMAPS moderated the tendency for observers to judge actors as 
less prejudiced than their behaviors. 
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 Method 
 Design 
Study 1 was a 3 (level of harm: no harm, ambiguous harm, clear harm) X continuous 
(participant PMAPS level) design. Attributions to prejudice and perceptions of harm and intent 
served as the dependent variables. Prior to collecting data, I conducted a power analysis 
(conducted using G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) which indicated that 263 
participants would be adequate to power (1-ß = 0.80, α = 0.05) analyses to detect interactions of 
moderate effect sizes (interaction ΔR2 = 0.05). 
 Participants 
Participants were college students (90.8% were in their first or second year) who were 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Participants received credit toward a course 
research participation requirement, however once the participant elected to sign up for the study, 
completion of the study was not required for credit to be granted. In total, 230 participants began 
the study. However, only participants who completed all measures and whose data could be 
matched from both parts of the study (see procedures below) were included in the final sample. 
This resulted in a final sample size of 207 participants. Only participants who self-identified as 
White/Caucasian were able to sign up for the study (this criterion was enforced by the 
department’s participant management software that made the study available to participants who 
self-identified as White/Caucasian in a prescreening survey). The final sample consisted of 78 
male participants and 129 female participants age 18 to 51 years old (M = 19.29, SD = 3.36).  
 Procedure 
Study 1 consisted of a two part web-based survey. In part one, participants completed the 
PMAPS at the beginning of the semester as part of a large sample prescreening of several 
different psychometric instruments. After completing part one, participants were eligible to 
participate in part two of the study at a time of their choosing during the remainder of the 
semester. On average, responses to part two were 33.23 days (SD = 18.14) after participating in 
part one. After being presented with information pertaining to informed consent, participants 
provided demographic information (age, gender, ethnicity, and class year). On the following 
page, participants were presented with one of three randomly assigned vignettes (see Appendix 
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B) corresponding to the three different experimental conditions manipulating level of harm (no 
harm, ambiguous harm, clear harm). The written vignettes were accompanied by a photographic 
image (see Appendix C) with labels identifying the names of the two characters in the vignette. 
All three vignettes described a White landlord (the actor) who, after showing an apartment to a 
Black student (the target), informed the student that he had decided to rent the apartment to 
another applicant. Three alternate story endings were used to manipulate information about the 
level of harm done to the target (no harm, ambiguous harm, clear harm). In the no harm story 
ending, the target was described as not suffering any negative consequences as a result of the 
actor’s behavior (Jason was not disappointed because he had already found an apartment he 
liked better). No information about harm was provided in the ambiguous harm condition. For the 
clear harm condition, the story ending described the target as being negatively affected by the 
behavior of the actor (Jason was very disappointed because he had to eventually settle for an 
apartment that he didn’t like nearly as much). On separate pages following the vignette page, 
participants were asked to respond to several items regarding their judgments about the scenario 
they had just read. Following the materials for the current study, participants completed 
measures for several unrelated studies. 
 Materials and measures 
 Propensity to make attributions to prejudice. 
Participants completed the PMAPS (Miller et al., 2013) in part one of the study. The 15-
item PMAPS consisted of four subscales. The expectation subscale contained four items that 
measured individuals’ perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice (e.g., Racist behavior is 
more widespread than people think it is). The four-item trivialization subscale measured attitudes 
that the concerns racial minorities have about racial prejudice are unjustified (e.g., Racial 
minorities are too worried about being discriminated against). The four-item vigilance subscale 
measured the cognitive effort that individuals invest in thinking about prejudice and looking out 
for cues indicating prejudice (e.g., I am on the lookout for instances of prejudice or 
discrimination). The three-item efficacy subscale measured individuals’ confidence in 
recognizing expressions of prejudice (e.g., I find that prejudice and discrimination are pretty 
easy to spot). See Appendix A for a complete list of the PMAPS items and subscales. All items 
were measured on a nine-point scale with anchors at 1 = disagree very strongly and 9 = agree 
22 
 
very strongly. Subscale scores were created for each participant by taking the average score of 
the items within each subscale. Each of the subscales were found to demonstrate adequate 
reliability (expectation α = .73, trivialization α = .84, vigilance α = .78, efficacy α = .68).  An 
overall PMAPS score was created by averaging all 15 items in the scale after inflecting the items 
in the vigilance subscale (α = .80) so that higher scores indicated higher levels of the propensity 
to make attributions to prejudice. 
 Judgments of prejudice and discrimination. 
Participants first responded to an open-ended question asking them to provide their own 
reasons for why they thought that the landlord did not rent the apartment to the student. 
Specifically, participants were asked “Why do you think that Mike did not rent the apartment to 
Jason?” and were provided an empty text-box to type in their answers. These responses were 
independently coded by two judges for the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of any 
mention that the race of the target could have been the reason why the landlord did not rent the 
apartment to the target. The judges were instructed to only code the presence of an attribution to 
prejudice if race was explicitly mentioned in the participant’s response. As an example, Because 
Jason was black, was coded 1 (attributing the actor’s behavior to prejudice) because it was clear 
that the participant thought that the actor racially discriminated against the target based on his 
race. Conversely, Maybe Jason did not check out on a credit report, was coded 0 (no attribution 
to prejudice) because the target’s credit rating, not his race, was the only reason provided by the 
participant for the actor’s behavior (even though the participant might have responded in this 
way because the target’s race activated negative stereotypes about Blacks). Initial interrater 
agreement was exceptionally high (kappa = .93), suggesting that the coding scheme was 
consistently implemented by the judges, and full agreement was later reached through discussion 
on the seven cases where the two judges originally disagreed on their coding. The resulting 
variable is referred to as spontaneous attributions to prejudice in the results that follow.  
On the following page of the survey, participants were asked to provide their judgments 
about the behavior, the actor, and the consequences for the target in the scenario using items 
modified from Swim et al. (2003; Study 3). All items were presented in random order among 
filler items that referred to the scenario but were not intended to be included in the analyses (see 
Appendix C for a complete list of items). Multi-item measures were averaged together after 
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reverse scoring antithetical items to create composite variables where higher scores represented 
higher levels of the construct. Three items (α = .91) were used to measure participants’ 
attributions of the harm done to the target (e.g., Using your best judgment, how much harm did 
Mike cause Jason?) on a nine-point scale with anchors at 1 = None and 9 = Very High. Three 
items (α = .89) were used to measure participants’ attributions of the extent to which the actor 
intended to discriminate against the target (e.g., Using your best judgment, how much did Mike 
intend to racially discriminate against Jason?) on a nine-point scale with anchors at 1 = No 
Intent and 9 = Very High Intent. Four items (α = .92) were used to measure attributions that the 
behavior of the actor was racially prejudiced (e.g., Mike's behavior was racist) on a nine-point 
response scale with anchors at 1 = Disagree Very Strongly and 9 = Agree Very Strongly. Four 
items (α = .91) were used to measure attributions that the actor was racially prejudiced (e.g., 
Mike is prejudiced toward Blacks) on a nine-point response scale with anchors at 1 = Disagree 
Very Strongly and 9 = Agree Very Strongly. 
 Results and Discussion 
 Data screening and manipulation checks 
Prior to conducting the analyses, the procedures described in Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2013) were followed to check the data for violations of the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
and outliers. Distributions of the variables approximated normal distributions (assessed using 
histograms and descriptive statistics). No univariate outliers were found when examining the z-
transformed variables for values in excess of 3.29 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Additionally, 
inspection of the scatterplots and R2 change values for a quadratic fit improvement revealed that 
the relationships between the PMAPS and attributions of prejudice to the behavior and to the 
actor were roughly homoscedastic and best fitted to a linear equation in each of the three 
experimental conditions. Descriptive statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix by experimental 
condition for the PMAPS and each of the dependent measures are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics as Different Levels of Harm 
Condition Variable Mean SD rIntent rBehavior rActor rPMAPS 
Harm 4.22 2.02 .55** .55** .53** -.03 
Intent 3.53 2.03 - .79** .79** -.02 
Prejudiced Behavior 4.47 2.14  - .91** .08 
Prejudiced Actor 4.58 1.89   - .03 
All Conditions 
Combined 
PMAPS 5.35 0.89    - 
Harm 2.89a 1.93 .75** .61** .62** -.12 
Intent 3.28a 2.26 - .79** .84** -.15 
Prejudiced Behavior 4.08a 2.14  - .92** -.16 
Prejudiced Actor 4.25a 1.86   - -.09 
No Harm 
PMAPS 5.39a 0.98    - 
Harm 4.53b 1.75 .46** .51** .47** .06 
Intent 3.57a 1.87 - .82** .73** .12 
Prejudiced Behavior 4.45a 1.92  - .88** .28* 
Prejudiced Actor 4.61a 1.73   - .14 
Ambiguous Harm 
PMAPS 5.40a 0.85    - 
Harm 5.08b 1.77 .50** .53** .52** .05 
Intent 3.71a 1.96 - .80** .79** .02 
Prejudiced Behavior 4.84a 2.32  - .93** .16 
Prejudiced Actor 4.84a 2.05   - .06 
Clear Harm 
PMAPS 5.27a 0.86    - 
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Note. For each variable, mean values that do not share a common superscript were significantly different between conditions at p < 
.05. For the bivariate correlations, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Across all conditions, attributions of harm to the target and attributions of the actor’s 
intent to racially discriminate were moderately correlated (Table 1). Consistent with Swim and 
colleagues’ (2003) findings, attributions of the actor’s intent to racially discriminate were more 
strongly related to attributions of prejudice to the behavior and attributions of prejudice to the 
actor than were attributions of harm to the target (Table 1), suggesting that perceptions of intent 
are more important in making attributions to prejudice than are perceptions of the harm caused 
by the action. Also consistent with Swim and colleagues’ (2003) findings, the relationship 
between attributions of prejudice to the behavior and to the actor were highly related (Table 1). 
Contrary to Swim colleagues’ (2003) findings, the average attributions of prejudice to the actor 
was higher than the average attributions of prejudice to the behavior, but this difference was not 
statistically significant (t(206) = 1.70, p = .10), nor was the difference moderated by level of 
harm manipulated in the experimental conditions (condition X target of attribution 
actor/behavior F(2, 204) = 0.79, p = .45). Thus, there was no evidence that attributions of 
prejudice differed between attributions to the behavior and attributions to the actor. 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that there were no significant 
differences in the average of the PMAPS scores between experimental conditions, F(2, 204) = 
0.49, p = .61, indicating that random assignment was effective in controlling for PMAPS levels 
between conditions. Attributions of harm to the target were significantly affected by the 
experimental manipulation, F(2, 204) = 26.33, p < .001. Post-hoc analyses revealed that 
attributions of harm to the target were greater in the ambiguous and clear harm condition 
compared to the no harm condition (ps < .001), but were not significantly different between the 
ambiguous and clear harm condition (p = .21, see Table 1). This finding suggests that the 
different story endings were partially successful in manipulating perceptions of harm. 
Perceptions of the actor’s intent, attributions to prejudiced behavior, and attributions to a 
prejudiced actor were not significantly different between conditions (Fs < 2.15, ps > .12, see 
Table 1), suggesting that the harm manipulation was not effective in influencing participants’ 
attributions to prejudice. 
 Moderation Effects of Information about Harm 
Three dummy coded variables were created to code for the experimental conditions, such 
that one variable was created for each condition where a value of 1 was entered for the condition, 
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and 0s were entered for the other two conditions (e.g., for the variable representing the no harm 
condition, 1 was entered for all cases in the no harm condition and 0s were entered for all cases 
in the ambiguous and clear harm conditions). To test for differences in the relationship between 
the PMAPS and attributions to prejudice between the three conditions, the Process add-on for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2013) was used to simultaneously enter two of the dummy coded experimental 
conditions along with the PMAPS. The Process software handled the computation and entry of 
the condition X PMAPS two-way interaction terms as well as provided tests of the change in R2 
due to the interactions and the simple slopes analyses. To fully test all of the condition X 
PMAPS two-way interactions for each aspect of the three conditions in the design, it was 
necessary to conduct two separate simultaneous regressions. This procedure was repeated for 
each of the criterion measures: spontaneous attributions to prejudice, attributions of prejudice to 
the behavior, attributions of prejudice to the actor, and the difference between attributions of 
prejudice to the behavior and actor (calculated by subtracting attributions of prejudice to the 
actor from attributions of prejudice to the behavior). The interaction terms in these models tested 
for the difference in the regression coefficient of the PMAPS between the experimental 
conditions manipulating levels of harm. 
Spontaneous attributions to prejudice (i.e., the presence of attributions to prejudice in 
participants’ written responses) were analyzed using a logistic regression version of the model 
described above to assess whether the PMAPS was related to the likelihood that individuals 
spontaneously made attributions to prejudice at different levels of information about harm. None 
of the predictor variables nor any of the interaction terms were significant predictors in the 
model (ps > .19, N = 207, model log likelihood = 6.13, Nagelkerke R2 = .03). The PMAPS did 
not predict spontaneous attributions to prejudice in any of the three experimental conditions (ps > 
.33), nor did spontaneous attributions to prejudice significantly differ by condition (χ2(2) = 4.23, 
p = .12), although there was a non-significant pattern of responses, such that there was a higher 
proportion of spontaneous attributions to prejudice in the clear harm condition and a lower 
proportion of spontaneous attributions to prejudice in the no harm and ambiguous harm 
conditions (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Distribution of Spontaneous Attributions to Prejudice by Condition 
Condition 
No Attribution to 
Prejudice 
Attribution to 
Prejudice Total 
No Harm 40 (63.5) 23 (36.5) 63 
Ambiguous Harm 44 (62.0) 27 (38.0) 71 
Clear Harm 35 (47.9) 38 (52.1) 73 
Total 119 (57.5) 88 (42.5) 207 
Note. The percentages of responses appear in parentheses next to the frequency count. 
Spontaneous attributions to prejudice did not differ by condition (χ2(2) = 4.23, p = .12). 
 
Evidence of the moderating effect of information about harm on the PMAPS was found 
in the analysis predicting attributions of prejudice to the behavior. The effect of the PMAPS was 
stronger in the ambiguous harm condition than in the no harm condition (interaction ΔR2 = .03, 
F(1, 201) = 5.79, p = .02), but the effect in the ambiguous harm condition was not significantly 
different from the effect in the clear harm condition (interaction ΔR2 < .01, F(1, 201) = 0.25, p = 
.62). Additionally, the effect of the PMAPS in the clear harm condition was marginally different 
from the effect in the no harm condition (interaction ΔR2 = .02, F(1, 201) = 3.31, p = .06). Table 
3 displays the regression coefficients by experimental condition of the simple slopes analysis 
(described above) showing the relationship between the PMAPS and attributions of prejudice to 
the behavior, actor, and behavior – actor difference. Participants’ PMAPS scores significantly 
predicted attributions of prejudice to the behavior only in the ambiguous harm condition (see 
Table 3), such that higher levels of the PMAPS were related to higher levels of attributions of 
prejudice to the behavior. Figure 1 displays a plot of the simple slopes from this analysis. These 
data provide partial support for the hypothesis that beliefs and expectations regarding racial 
prejudice influence attributions to prejudice when information about the harm of an action 
caused to a Black target by a White actor is more ambiguous. 
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Table 3. Simple Slopes Analysis of the Relationship between the PMAPS and Attributions 
to Prejudice at Different Levels of Harm 
Criterion Condition b SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
No Harm -0.34a 0.27 .21 -0.89 0.20 
Ambiguous Harm 0.63b 0.30 .04 0.04 1.21 
Clear Harm 0.42ab 0.29 .14 -0.15 0.99 
Prejudiced 
Behavior 
Model R2 = .06, F(5, 201) = 2.52, p = .03 
No Harm -0.17a 0.24 .49 -0.65 0.31 
Ambiguous Harm 0.29a 0.27 .28 -0.24 0.81 
Clear Harm 0.13a 0.26 .62 -0.38 0.64 
Prejudiced 
Actor 
Model R2 = .03, F(5, 201) = 1.04, p = .40 
No Harm -0.17a 0.11 .12 -0.39 0.05 
Ambiguous Harm 0.34b 0.12 < .01 0.10 0.58 
Clear Harm 0.29b 0.12 .01 0.06 0.52 
Behavior - 
Actor 
Difference 
Model R2 = .08, F(5, 201) = 3.61, p < .01 
Note. Coefficients are unstandardized regression weights. Within each criterion measure, 
coefficients that do not share a common superscript are significantly different at p < .05. Lower 
CI and Upper CI are the lower and upper limits respectively of a 95% confidence interval for the 
effect. 
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Figure 1. Simple Slopes for Attributions to Prejudice Behavior by Condition 
 
 
In predicting attributions of prejudice to the actor, the PMAPS was not a significant 
predictor in any of the three conditions, nor were the effects different between conditions 
(interaction ΔR2s < .01). Thus, from this analysis, no evidence was found to support the 
hypothesis that the PMAPS would be more strongly related to attributions of prejudice to the 
actor in the ambiguous condition. However, the regression coefficients for the PMAPS in 
predicting attributions of prejudice to the actor trended in a similar pattern to that of the effects 
of the PMAPS on attributions of prejudice to the behavior, such that the largest effect was 
observed in the ambiguous harm condition and although the relationship was non-significant, it 
was in the predicted positive direction.  
In an exploratory analysis predicting whether the PMAPS would be related to a tendency 
to make stronger attributions of prejudice to the behavior or the actor, the PMAPS was found to 
be positively related to stronger attributions of prejudice to the behavior than to the actor in a 
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both the ambiguous and clear harm conditions, but not in the no harm condition (see Table 3). 
Additionally, although the effects of the PMAPS in the ambiguous and clear harm conditions 
were not significantly different from each other (interaction ΔR2 < .01, F(1, 201) = 0.08, p = .78), 
the PMAPS effects in both the ambiguous and clear harm conditions were significantly different 
from the effect in the no harm condition (interaction ΔR2 = .04, F(1, 201) = 9.63, p < .01, and 
ΔR2 = .04, F(1, 201) = 8.23, p < .01 respectively). Figure 2 displays a plot of the simple slopes 
from this analysis. The slope in the no harm condition was non-significantly negative, but in the 
ambiguous and clear harm conditions the slopes were significantly positive, suggesting that 
when information about harm was ambiguous or clear, increasingly higher levels of the PMAPS 
were associated with stronger attributions of harm to the behavior than to the actor. This finding 
suggests that beliefs and expectations regarding racial prejudice moderate whether individuals 
see the actor or the behavior as more prejudiced. 
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Figure 2. Simple Slopes Predicting the Difference Between Attributions to Prejudiced 
Behavior and Attributions to a Prejudiced Actor 
 
 
In summary, the PMAPS significantly predicted attributions of prejudice to the behavior 
when there was no information about the harm done by a White actor to a Black target (i.e., in 
the ambiguous harm condition) and this effect was significantly different than the effect in the no 
harm condition. Thus, partial support was found for the hypothesis that individual differences in 
the tendency to make attributions to prejudice are stronger when information about harm is most 
ambiguous. More generally, the finding that a tendency to make attributions to prejudice was 
predictive of attributions to prejudice in a specific scenario where information about the harm 
done to the target was unavailable is important because in real life, observers often do not have 
information about the degree of harm suffered by the targets of racial discrimination. Thus, the 
current study suggests that a propensity to make attributions to prejudice may play a role in the 
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likelihood that observers will see prejudice in interracial interactions where the consequences of 
those interactions are ambiguous. 
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Chapter 3 - Study 2 
As a further test of the hypothesis that different informational cues will moderate the 
effects of the tendency to make attributions to prejudice in predicting situational attributions to 
prejudice, I conducted a second experiment that manipulated information about an actor’s intent 
to racially discriminate (e.g., no intent, ambiguous intent, clear intent conditions). As previously 
discussed, information about an actor’s intent to discriminate appears to more strongly influence 
judgments of prejudice compared to information about harm (e.g., Swim et al., 2003). Thus, 
Study 2 served as an additional test of the boundary conditions for the effects of the tendency to 
make attributions as measured by the PMAPS because information about intent should be more 
difficult for individuals to discount in making judgments about expressions of prejudice.  
In Study 2, I predicted a main effect for level of intent, such that higher levels of 
prejudice would be perceived when it is clearer that the actor intentionally discriminated based 
on negative attitudes toward a racial minority (i.e., in the clear intent condition). Additionally, I 
predicted a main effect for the PMAPS, such that it would be positively related to the perceived 
likelihood that the actor in the story was prejudiced independent of information about intent. 
Most relevant to my hypothesis that individual differences in the tendency to make attributions to 
prejudice will be most predictive of attributions to prejudice in ambiguous situations, I predicted 
an interaction between intent and the PMAPS, such that the PMAPS would be a stronger 
predictor of attributions to prejudice when no information about intent was provided (i.e., in the 
ambiguous intent condition) compared to when information about intent was provided (i.e., in 
the no intent and clear intent conditions). 
As in Study 1, I also attempted to replicate findings by Swim et al. (2003) who found that 
when intent to discriminate was ambiguous, observers were generally less likely to attribute 
prejudice to the actor than to judge the actor’s behavior as prejudiced, but when intent to 
discriminate was clear, there was little difference between judgments of the actor and the actor’s 
behavior. The authors interpreted this to mean that when intent is uncertain, observers may need 
more evidence (e.g., more demonstrations of similar behavior) before they are willing to attribute 
more stable qualities to an individual, especially for normatively undesirable characteristics such 
as prejudice. To extend this finding, I explored whether the PMAPS moderates this effect. Study 
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1 found no evidence that observers were more likely to make attributions of prejudice to the 
behavior than to the actor across different levels of harm, but did find evidence that the effects of 
information about harm interact with the PMAPS in predicting this difference. Study 2 examined 
whether this effect could be replicated under conditions where different information about intent 
is provided (or not provided). 
 Method 
 Design 
Study 2 was a 3 (level of intent: no intent, ambiguous intent, clear intent) X continuous 
(participant PMAPS level) design. Attributions to prejudice and perceptions of harm and intent 
served as the dependent variables. Prior to collecting data, I conducted a power analysis 
(conducted using G*Power; Faul et al., 2007) which indicated that 263 participants would be 
adequate to power (1-ß = 0.80, α = 0.05) analyses to detect interactions of moderate effect sizes 
(interaction ΔR2 = 0.05). 
 Participants 
Participants were college students (83.4% were in their first or second year) who were 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Participants received credit toward a course 
research participation requirement, however once the participant elected to sign up for the study, 
completion of the study was not required for credit to be granted. In total, 308 participants began 
the study. However, only participants who completed all measures and whose data could be 
matched from both parts of the study were included in the final sample. This resulted in a final 
sample size of 259 participants. Only participants who self-identified as White/Caucasian were 
able to sign up for the study (this criterion was enforced by the department’s participant 
management software that made the study available to participants who self-identified as 
White/Caucasian in a prescreening survey). The final sample consisted of 81 male participants 
and 178 female participants age 18 to 47 years old (M = 19.36, SD = 2.60).  
 Procedure 
The procedures used for Study 2 were exactly the same as those described in Study 1 
with the exception that Study 2 used different vignettes. In Study 2, the vignettes provided no 
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information about harm to the target. Rather, the information provided about the intent of the 
actor to racially discriminate against the target was manipulated within the vignettes.  On 
average, responses to part two (where the vignettes were presented and the dependent measures 
were measured) were 30.69 days (SD = 16.80) after participating in part one where the PMAPS 
(15 items, α = .83) was measured. The base vignette and photo describing a White landlord 
informing a Black student that he would not be able to rent to him were the same as those used in 
Study 1. Three alternate story endings were used to manipulate information about the actor’s 
intent to racially discriminate (see Appendix C). In the no intent condition, the story ending 
provided a description of the actor’s reason for not renting the apartment to the target that did not 
involve racial discrimination (A few days later, Mike phoned Jason to say that he was renting the 
apartment out to another individual who was higher on the waiting list). No information was 
given about the actor’s reason for not renting the apartment to the target in the ambiguous intent 
condition. In the clear intent condition, the actor was described as intending to discriminate 
based on his attitudes toward Blacks (A few days later, Mike phoned Jason to say that he was 
renting the apartment out to another individual. Mike suspected that Jason, being a young Black 
male, may keep company with people he didn’t want hanging around the building). 
As per the procedures described in Study 1, coding of the participant’s written responses 
to the open-ended question about the actor’s reason for not renting the apartment to the target 
was conducted by two judges for spontaneous attributions to prejudice. Interrater agreement was 
high (kappa = .88) and agreement was later reached through discussion on the sixteen cases 
where the two judges originally disagreed on their coding. The continuous dependent measures 
were the same as Study 1 (harm 3 items, α = .86; intent 3 items, α = .90; prejudiced behavior 4 
items, α = .91; prejudiced actor 4 items, α = .91) 
 Results and Discussion 
 Data screening and manipulation checks 
Prior to conducting the analyses, the procedures described in Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2013) were followed to check the data for violations of the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
and outliers. Distributions of the variables approximated normal distributions (assessed using 
histograms and descriptive statistics). No univariate outliers were found when examining the z-
transformed variables for values in excess of 3.29 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Additionally, 
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scatterplots and R2 change values for a quadratic fit improvement suggested that the relationships 
between the PMAPS and attributions to prejudiced behavior and actor were roughly 
homoscedastic and best fitted to a linear equation in the no intent and ambiguous intent 
conditions. However, there was significant curvilinearity in the clear intent condition in 
predicting attributions of prejudice to the behavior and to the actor that were best fitted to  
quadratic, u-shaped curves (ΔR2 = .07, F(1, 77) = 5.85, p = .02, and (ΔR2 = .07, F(1, 77) = 5.53, 
p = .02 respectively; see Figures 3 and 4). Linear analyses (e.g., bivariate correlations, simple 
slopes coefficients) for this condition were interpreted with caution because they underestimate 
the true degree of the relationship between the PMAPS and attributions of prejudice in the clear 
intent condition. Descriptive statistics and a bivariate correlation matrix by experimental 
condition for the PMAPS and each of the dependent measures are provided in Table 4. 
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Figure 3. Contrasting the Linear and Curvilinear Fits in the Clear Intent Condition for the 
Relationship Between the PMAPS and Attributions of Prejudice to the Behavior 
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Figure 4. Contrasting the Linear and Curvilinear Fits in the Clear Intent Condition for the 
Relationship Between the PMAPS and Attributions of Prejudice to the Actor 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics at Different Levels of Intent 
Condition Variable Mean SD rIntent rBehavior rActor rPMAPS 
Harm 4.68 1.77 .64** .63** .60** .23** 
Intent 3.85 1.92 - .80** .80** .22** 
Prejudiced Behavior 4.88 2.14  - .93** .19** 
Prejudiced Actor 4.91 1.98   - .20** 
All Conditions 
Combined 
PMAPS 5.29 0.97    - 
Harm 4.14 a 1.74 .72** .68** .67** .19 
Intent 3.26 a 1.82 - .85** .86** .12 
Prejudiced Behavior 3.93 a 2.07  - .94** .22* 
Prejudiced Actor 3.99 a 1.80   - .20 
No Intent 
PMAPS 5.15 a 1.01    - 
Harm 4.54 a 1.87 .61** .63** .54** .22* 
Intent 3.72 a 1.91 - .86** .81** .30** 
Prejudiced Behavior 4.54 a 1.91  - .88** .25* 
Prejudiced Actor 4.66 b 1.83   - .28** 
Ambiguous Intent 
PMAPS 5.39 a 0.91    - 
Harm 5.40 b 1.41 .49** .37** .43** .29** 
Intent 4.59 b 1.82 - .63** .65** .21 
Prejudiced Behavior 6.26 b 1.78  - .91** .10 
Prejudiced Actor 6.16 c 1.70   - .10 
Clear Intent 
PMAPS 5.30 a 1.00    - 
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Note. For each variable, mean values that do not share a common superscript were significantly different between conditions at p < 
.05. For the bivariate correlations, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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The bivariate relationships in Study 2 followed a similar pattern to that observed in Study 
1. Attributions of harm to the target and attributions of the actor’s intent to racially discriminate 
were moderately correlated (Table 4). Further replicating findings from Study 1, attributions of 
the actor’s intent to racially discriminate were more strongly related to attributions of prejudice 
to the behavior and to the actor than were attributions of harm to the target (Table 4), suggesting 
that perceptions of the intent of the actor to racially discriminate are more related to attributions 
to prejudice than are perceptions of harm done to the target. In Study 2, as in Study 1, 
attributions of prejudice to the behavior and to the actor were highly related (Table 4) and 
attributions of prejudice to the behavior did not differ from attributions of prejudice to the actor 
(t(258) = 0.67, p = .50). 
A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that there were no 
significant differences in the average of the PMAPS scores between experimental conditions, 
F(2, 256) = 1.35, p = .26 (see Table 4), indicating that random assignment was effective in 
controlling for PMAPS levels between conditions. The experimental manipulation of 
information about intent significantly affected attributions of harm to the target (F(2, 256) = 
11.64, p < .001), attributions of the actor’s intent to discriminate (F(2, 256) = 10.81, p < .001), 
attributions of prejudice to the behavior (F(2, 256) = 32.07, p < .001), and attributions of 
prejudice to the actor (F(2, 256) = 31.33, p < .001). The pattern of effects revealed in the simple 
effects analyses (see Table 4) was that the no intent condition did not significantly differ from 
the ambiguous intent condition for levels of harm, intent, and attributions of prejudice to the 
behavior (ps > .10), although the trend was for higher ratings of these measures in the ambiguous 
compared to the no intent condition. However, attributions of prejudice to the actor were higher 
in the ambiguous intent condition than in the no intent condition (p = .04). More consistently, for 
all of the dependent measures, higher ratings were observed in the clear intent condition 
compared to the ambiguous and no intent conditions (ps < .01; see Table 4). Thus the 
experimental manipulation of information about the actor’s intent to racially discriminate 
appeared to be successful in affecting participants’ perceptions of the harm to the target, 
attributions of prejudice to the behavior, and most notably, attributions of prejudice to the actor, 
such that stronger attributions were made when information suggested that the actor intended to 
racially discriminate. 
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 Moderation Effects of Information about Intent 
Analysis procedures for Study 2 were the same as those described in Study 1. To test for 
the moderating effect of information about intent on the tendency to make attributions to 
prejudice between the three conditions, the Process add-on for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) was used to 
simultaneously enter two of the dummy coded experimental conditions and the PMAPS. The 
Process software handled the computation and entry of the condition X PMAPS two-way 
interaction, as well as computation of the simple slopes analyses. All of the criterion measures of 
attributions to prejudice (spontaneous attributions to prejudice, attributions of prejudice to the 
behavior, attributions of prejudice to the actor, and the difference between attributions of 
prejudice to the behavior and actor) were analyzed using this procedure. The interaction terms in 
these models tested for the difference in the regression coefficient of the PMAPS between the 
experimental conditions manipulating levels of intent. 
Information about the actor’s intent to racially discriminate appeared to affect 
spontaneous attributions of prejudice (see Table 5). The frequency of spontaneous attributions of 
prejudice were lowest in the no intent condition, higher in the ambiguous intent condition, and 
highest in the clear intent condition (χ2(2) = 32.38, p < .001), indicating that information about 
intent influences attributions to prejudice. When the available information suggested that the 
actor had a reason for his actions that did not involve the race of the target, observers were less 
likely to make attributions to prejudice than when a reason was not provided or suggested that 
the actor intended to racially discriminate. Furthermore, from the logistic regression model 
(model log likelihood = 43.28, Nagelkerke R2 = .21), there was marginal evidence that the effect 
of the tendency to make attributions to prejudice was moderated by information about the actor’s 
intent to racially discriminate, such that there was a marginally significant interaction testing the 
difference in the effect of the PMAPS between the no intent and clear intent conditions (z = -
1.79, p = .07). The differences in the effect of the PMAPS between the no intent and ambiguous 
intent conditions and between the ambiguous intent and clear intent conditions were non-
significant (ps > .21). The PMAPS predicted the likelihood that individuals spontaneously made 
attributions to prejudice in the no intent condition and marginally in the ambiguous intent 
condition, such that higher levels of the PMAPS were related to a higher probability of making 
an attribution to prejudice, but not in the clear intent condition (see Table 6 and Figure 5). These 
findings suggest that a stronger propensity to make attributions to prejudice may lead observers 
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to be more likely to make attributions to prejudice even when alternative, race-neutral reasons 
for an actor’s behavior are provided and also when no information about the actors’ reasons are 
available.  
 
Table 5. Distribution of Spontaneous Attributions to Prejudice by Condition 
Condition 
No Attribution to 
Prejudice 
Attribution to 
Prejudice Total 
No Intent 58 (71.6) 23 (28.4) 81 
Ambiguous Intent 55 (56.1) 43 (43.9) 98 
Clear Intent 22 (27.5) 58 (72.5) 80 
Total 135 (52.1) 124 (47.9) 259 
Note. The percentages of responses appear in parentheses next to the frequency count (χ2(2) = 
32.38, p < .001). 
 
In testing whether information about intent moderated the effects of the PMAPS on 
participants’ attributions of prejudice to the behavior and to the actor, none of the two-way 
condition X PMAPS interactions were significant (ΔR2 < .01, ps > .17). However, the PMAPS 
significantly predicted attributions of prejudice to the behavior in the no intent and ambiguous 
intent conditions (see Table 6 and Figure 6), such that higher levels of the PMAPS were related 
to higher levels of attributions of prejudice to the behavior. Similarly, the PMAPS was positively 
related to attributions of prejudice to the actor in the ambiguous intent condition and marginally 
in the no intent condition (see Table 6 and Figure 7). These results are consistent with the results 
from the analyses of spontaneous attributions to prejudice, suggesting that stronger attributions 
to prejudice can be predicted by individual differences in the propensity to make attributions to 
prejudice when information about the reasons for the behavior are unavailable, or when 
alternative, race-neutral reasons are provided.  
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Table 6. Simple Slopes Analysis of the Relationship between the PMAPS and Attributions 
to Prejudice at Different Levels of Intent 
Criterion Condition b SE p Lower CI Upper CI 
No Intent 0.66a 0.27 .02 0.12 1.19 
Ambiguous Intent 0.42a 0.24 .08 -0.04 0.88 
Clear Intent -0.01a 0.25 .97 -0.51 0.48 
Spontaneous 
Attributions 
Model log likelihood = 43.28, Nagelkerke R2 = .21 
No Intent 0.46a 0.21 .03 0.05 0.87 
Ambiguous Intent 0.52a 0.21 .01 0.11 0.94 
Clear Intent 0.18a 0.21 .41 -0.24 0.60 
Prejudiced 
Behavior 
Model R2 = .24 F(5, 253) = 15.59, p < .001 
No Intent 0.36a 0.19 .07 -0.03 0.74 
Ambiguous Intent 0.56a 0.20 .005 0.17 0.94 
Clear Intent 0.18a 0.20 .37 -0.21 0.56 
Prejudiced 
Actor 
Model R2 = .23 F(5, 253) = 15.47, p < .001 
No Intent 0.10a 0.09 .26 -0.08 0.28 
Ambiguous Intent -0.03a 0.09 .70 -0.21 0.14 
Clear Intent 0.0006a 0.09 .995 -0.18 0.18 
Behavior - 
Actor 
Difference 
Model R2 = .02 F(5, 253) = 0.99, p = .42 
Note. Coefficients are unstandardized regression weights. Within each criterion measure, 
coefficients that do not share a common superscript are significantly different at p < .05. Lower 
CI and Upper CI are the lower and upper limits respectively of a 95% confidence interval for the 
effect. 
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Figure 5. Simple Slopes Predicting Spontaneous Attributions of Prejudice 
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Figure 6. Simple Slopes Predicting Attributions of Prejudice to the Behavior 
 
48 
 
Figure 7. Simple Slopes Predicting Attributions of Prejudice to the Actor 
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The exploratory model predicting the difference between attributions of prejudice to the 
behavior and to the actor accounted for only 2% of the variance and none of the PMAPS effects 
or interactions were significant (see Table 6). Thus, Study 2 failed to replicate the finding from 
Study 1 that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice moderates whether observers more 
strongly attribute prejudice to the behavior or to the actor.  
In summary, Study 2 provided support for the hypothesis that individual differences in 
the tendency to make attributions to prejudice predict attributions to prejudice in situations where 
interracial interaction occurs between a White actor and a Black target. Partial support was also 
found for the hypothesis that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice is most influential 
when information about the intent to racially discriminate is most ambiguous. Although the 
interactions testing the differences between no intent, ambiguous intent, and clear intent 
conditions were not significant, the pattern of effects did trend in the predicted direction, such 
that at least descriptively, the strongest relationships between the PMAPS and attributions of 
prejudice to the behavior and actor were observed in the ambiguous intent condition. 
Furthermore, the PMAPS predicted attributions to prejudice when the reason for the actor’s 
behavior was unavailable and when an alternative reason was provided, but not when the actor’s 
reason more clearly suggested an intent to racially discriminate. This finding is important 
because information about an actor’s intent to racially discriminate is often unavailable to the 
observer, and when it is, this information is likely to imply that the actor did not intend to 
racially discriminate. Individuals are motivated to avoid appearing racist (Plant & Devine, 1998) 
and are more likely to express prejudice when race-neutral alternative explanations are available, 
or situational ambiguity can mask expressions of prejudice (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; 
Dovidio, 2001; Pearson, et al., 2009). Thus, the current findings that a tendency to make 
attributions to prejudice predicted attributions to prejudice when information about intent 
implied that an actor did not intend to racially discriminate and when information about intent 
was not available are important because these conditions are representative of situations that 
observers are more likely to experience in their social world. In conclusion, the results of Study 2 
support the more general hypothesis that attributions to prejudice can be predicted by the 
individual differences in beliefs and expectations regarding racial prejudice that are measured by 
the PMAPS. 
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Chapter 4 - Chapter 4 - General Discussion 
The purpose of the current studies was to assess whether beliefs and expectations 
regarding a tendency to make attributions to prejudice would predict attributions to prejudice in 
situations where racial discrimination prototypically might occur (e.g., a White individual 
causing an unfavorable outcome for a Black individual; Inman & Baron, 1996). Additionally, the 
current studies tested whether the tendency to make attributions to prejudice would interact with 
situational information about the harm caused to the target and information about the actor’s 
intent to racially discriminate. I hypothesized that higher levels of the propensity to make 
attributions to prejudice as measured by the PMAPS would be related to a higher likelihood of 
making attributions to prejudice when individuals observe an interracial interaction that may 
potentially involve racial discrimination (e.g., housing discrimination by a White landlord 
against a Black applicant). Additionally, I hypothesized that, because people tend to interpret 
ambiguous social information in ways that are consistent with their beliefs and expectations (e.g., 
Nickerson, 1998; Lord et al., 1979; Saucier & Miller 2003), this relationship would be strongest 
when information about harm and intent were most ambiguous.  
In two studies, participants were presented with a scenario where a White landlord 
declined to rent an apartment to a Black student. Participants were asked to provide reasons for 
the actor’s behavior and ratings of the level of prejudice in the actor’s behavior, as well as the 
level of prejudice they attributed to the actor himself. To control for priming effects of reporting 
their beliefs and expectations regarding racial prejudice more generally, participants completed 
the PMAPS in a seemingly unrelated study about one month (on average) prior to being 
presented with the scenarios in Studies 1 and 2.  
Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence in support of the hypothesis that a tendency to make 
attributions to prejudice would predict attributions to prejudice in scenarios where a White actor 
might discriminate against a Black target. In Study 1, information about the harm done to the 
target was manipulated in three conditions (no harm, ambiguous harm, and clear harm 
conditions). Participants’ attributions of prejudice to the behavior were predicted by the PMAPS 
in the ambiguous harm condition (i.e., where no information about harm was provided), but not 
in the no harm condition (i.e., where information suggested that no harm came to the target) or 
clear harm condition (i.e., when information clearly suggested that the target was harmed). This 
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finding was replicated in Study 2 where information about the actor’s intent to racially 
discriminate was manipulated in three conditions (no intent, ambiguous intent, and clear intent 
conditions) The PMAPS significantly predicted attributions to prejudice in the ambiguous intent 
condition (i.e., where no information about the actor’s intent to racially discrimination was 
provided) and in the no intent condition (i.e., where the information suggested a race-neutral 
reason for his behavior), such that participants at increasingly higher levels of the PMAPS were 
more likely to make spontaneous attributions to prejudice and rate the behavior and actor as 
more prejudiced. The PMAPS did not significantly predict attributions to prejudice in the clear 
intent conditions (i.e., where information suggested clear intent to racially discriminate). 
Partial support was also found for the hypothesis that a tendency to make attributions to 
prejudice would be strongest when information about harm and intent were most ambiguous. At 
least descriptively, in the ambiguous conditions where information about harm (Study 1) and 
intent (Study 2) were not provided, the strongest relationships between the PMAPS and 
participants’ attributions of prejudice to the behavior (Studies 1 and 2) and actor (Study 2) were 
observed. However, the interactions testing the difference in the relationship between the 
PMAPS and attributions did not consistently reach conventional levels of statistical significance. 
In Study 1, evidence for moderation was found in two of the four tests for moderation, but no 
significant evidence was found for moderation in Study 2. Specifically, in Study 1, attributions 
of prejudice to the behavior were predicted by the PMAPS in the ambiguous harm condition (i.e., 
where no information about harm was given) and this effect was significantly stronger than the 
effect in the no harm condition (i.e., where information suggested no harm came to the target), 
but not significantly stronger than the effect in the clear harm condition (i.e., where information 
suggested the target was harmed). In Study 2, the PMAPS predicted spontaneous attributions to 
prejudice and ratings of the level of prejudice demonstrated by the behavior and the level of 
prejudice attributed to the actor in the ambiguous intent condition (i.e., where no information 
about intent was given) and in the no intent condition (i.e., where information suggested that the 
actor had a race-neutral reason for his behavior), but these effects were not significantly different 
from the effect in the clear intent condition (i.e., where the information clearly suggested that the 
actor intended to racially discriminate). 
There are several possible explanations for this lack of consistent evidence for the 
moderating effects of information about harm and intent on the tendency to make attributions to 
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prejudice. In Study 1, in the clear harm condition, the tendency to make attributions to prejudice 
was found to have a non-significant, but positive relationship with attributions of prejudice to the 
behavior (see Table 3 and Figure 1). In other words, the effect of the PMAPS on attributions to 
prejudice in the clear harm condition trended in a similar direction to the significant effect 
observed in the ambiguous harm condition, thus making it difficult to find a significant 
difference between them.  
Furthermore, in Study 2, the significant positive relationship between the PMAPS and all 
three measures of attributions of prejudice in the ambiguous intent condition, and in the no intent 
condition (see Table 6), is consistent with previous findings that the PMAPS predicts attributions 
to prejudice when race-neutral reasons for potentially prejudiced behaviors are available, as well 
as when cues for prejudice are ambiguous (Miller et al., 2014). Together, such evidence may 
imply that observers who have a relatively higher tendency to make attributions to prejudice may 
be more likely to discount disconfirming information that is counter to attributions of prejudice. 
In the current studies, as well as being consistent with the previous study by Miller and 
colleagues (2014), the similarity of the effect of the PMAPS in predicting attributions to 
prejudice in the no intent and ambiguous intent conditions made it difficult to find a significant 
difference between them.  
Furthermore, although the information provided in the clear intent condition suggested 
that the actor’s reason for his behavior was due to his racial prejudice, participants were not 
directly told that the actor was racist. And while providing information that implied that the actor 
was prejudiced in the clear intent condition resulted in stronger attributions of prejudice 
compared to the ambiguous and no intent conditions, attributions to prejudice did not ceiling out 
in the clear intent condition (see Table 4). Avoiding ceiling effects was an intentional part of the 
design in Study 2, but this did leave room for the PMAPS to have an effect on attributions to 
prejudice in the clear intent condition. Although the relationship between the PMAPS and 
attributions to prejudice in the clear intent condition was non-significant, the effect was in the 
same direction as the effect in the ambiguous intent condition resulting in a non-significant test 
of the difference between the effects. This finding is consistent with a prior study by Miller, 
Hockett, and Saucier (manuscript in preparation) who, in a non-student sample, found that the 
PMAPS predicted attributions to prejudice when cues for prejudice were ambiguous as well as 
when cues for prejudice were more clear. These findings suggest that even when there is clear 
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evidence for prejudice, a relatively lower tendency to make attributions to prejudice may lead 
observers to deny that prejudice has occurred. 
 Implications 
Despite not finding consistent evidence of the moderating effects of information about 
harm and intent on the tendency to make attributions to prejudice, these data do provide more 
consistent evidence that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice can predict attributions to 
prejudice in situations where the potential for racial discrimination is present (e.g., an interracial 
interaction between White and Black individuals; Inman & Baron, 1996; Marti et al., 2000) and 
information about the actor’s intentions and the harmful consequences to the target are 
unavailable. This finding is important because observers often do not have information about 
harm and intent (Swim et al. 2003), and may therefore interpret the situation in a way that is 
consistent with their beliefs and expectations, as is proposed by theories and research on the 
biased assimilation of information (e.g., Nickerson, 1998; Lord et al., 1979; Saucier & Miller, 
2003). Even when information about an actor’s intent is available, this information is likely to 
come from an actor who is motivated to avoid being seen as racist and thus may be conveyed to 
imply that the actor is not prejudiced (e.g., Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio, 2001; Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988; McConahay, 1986; Pearson et al., 2009). Observers who 
have a stronger tendency to make attributions to prejudice may discount such race-neutral 
alternative explanations of actors’ intentions, and although the current studies do not examine the 
cognitive mechanisms by which such discounting may occur, the current findings are certainly 
consistent with this proposition. Future research should more systematically examine whether 
individuals who have a stronger tendency to make attributions to prejudice more strongly 
discount information that suggests non-prejudiced alternative reasons for an actor’s potentially 
prejudiced behaviors. 
Another important contribution of the current studies is that they examine the tendency to 
make attributions from the point of view of an observer. With a few notable exceptions (e.g., 
Inman & Baron, 1996; Marti et al., 2000; Sommers & Norton, 2006; Swim et al., 2003), the 
majority of research is concerned with factors that may influence attributions to prejudice from 
the perspective of the targets of prejudice (for reviews, see Barrett & Swim, 1998; Kaiser & 
Major, 2006; Major et al., 2002; Major & Sawyer, 2009). However, gaining a better 
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understanding of attributions to prejudice from the perspective of third party observers is also 
important. Often, observers are called upon to make judgments and decisions that affect both the 
actor and target when racial discrimination is claimed or disputed (e.g., the juries in criminal 
cases, individuals who monitor and enforce workplace anti-discrimination and anti-harassment 
policies). Therefore, an understanding of the factors that influence observers’ attributions to 
prejudice may also have important practical implications that can be applied to real world 
settings. 
The current studies also further validate the PMAPS as a measure of observers’ 
tendencies to make attributions to prejudice. Having the capability to measure differences in 
peoples’ expectations that others’ behavior towards stigmatized individuals reflects their 
underlying prejudice has many possible research applications. An understanding of the 
individual differences in making attributions to prejudice will help psychologists interested in 
studying the processes involved in identifying discrimination. For example, some individuals 
may be more likely to make certain types of errors (e.g., false positives and false negatives, in 
other words, seeing prejudice when it is not expressed and failing to see prejudice when it is 
expressed). Additionally, the PMAPS might help identify people who are more likely to engage 
in collective social action. For example, individuals who believe that stereotyping and 
discrimination are uncommon occurrences may lack the social consciousness and collective 
identity (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Vlope, 2004) needed to motivate engagement in 
activities to bring about social change. Furthermore, a tendency to see others as prejudiced may 
be accompanied by social costs, such as negative evaluations and social exclusion. The PMAPS 
could be a useful instrument for exploring how individuals manage the social consequences of 
making attributions to prejudice (e.g., Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003). Also related to social 
motivations, the PMAPS could help researchers study identity threat to majority group members 
who reject prejudice. Other ingroup members who openly express their prejudices through 
disparaging comments, stereotyping and discrimination may threaten the identities of Whites 
who are more likely to see prejudice in the world around them. Such individuals may respond by 
distancing themselves from their ingroup (e.g., Spears, Doosje, & Ellermers, 1997), or by 
confronting ingroup members who explicitly express prejudice (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003). 
In summary, it is through a psychometrically-sound measure such as the PMAPS that a better 
understanding of the consequences for third party observers can be achieved. 
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 Limitations 
The current studies are not without limitations. The results from an undergraduate sample 
in a Midwest region may not generalize to the broader population. Additionally, the hypothetical 
scenarios and the written vignette format used in the current studies may not generalize to real 
world events. However, it is not uncommon for individuals to encounter expressions of prejudice 
in the media (e.g., news stories, online comments) and thus the written format used in these 
studies is not necessarily invalid. Still, future research should examine how the PMAPS predicts 
judgments of prejudice in a more behavioral, interactive setting. Such an environment would also 
allow researchers to assess the influence of additional factors, such as the effect of corroborating, 
or contradictory judgments expressed by the actor, the target, and other bystanders. 
Additionally, consistent with Swim and colleagues’ (2003) methods, ambiguity in the 
current studies was operationalized as a lack of information. As such, the level of ambiguity was 
relative to the no (harm/intent) and clear (harm/intent) conditions. However, there are different 
ways in which informational ambiguity can arise as, for example, from the presence of 
conflicting information. Future research should manipulate prejudice confirming and prejudice 
disconfirming information in the same scenario (i.e., both pieces of information are sometimes 
present) to test whether the tendency to make attributions to prejudice is related to the 
differential weighting of information that is consistent or inconsistent with prior beliefs and 
expectations. 
An additional limitation related to the nature of the experimental stimuli may account for 
the lack of an effect of information about harm on attributions of prejudice in Study 1. In the 
vignette for the clear harm condition, the target was described as only suffering the 
psychological harm of being disappointed because he had to settle for a less-preferred apartment. 
Participants may not have perceived this as a high amount of harm. Future research should 
examine how more extreme levels of harm suffered by the targets of prejudice affect attributions 
to prejudice. 
A further limitation is related to the self-report method of measuring participants’ 
PMAPS responses as well as the dependent measures. Prior research suggests that the PMAPS is 
not related to a tendency to provide socially acceptable answers (Miller et al., 2013); however, 
this tendency was not measured in the current studies. Furthermore, the PMAPS is a measure 
with emerging, but not yet fully established, evidence of validity (although the current studies do 
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support its predictive validity). In relation to the dependent measures, asking participants to rate 
how prejudiced they thought the behavior was may have introduced a demand characteristic, and 
although measurement of attributions to prejudice was equivalent across the experimental 
conditions, participants may have guessed the purpose of the studies. This limitation was 
partially addressed by having participants respond to an open-ended question (see Inman & 
Baron, 1996 for similar methods) about the reason for the actor’s behavior in the vignette prior to 
them being presented with the rating scales on the following page. In Study 2, the PMAPS 
predicted participants’ attributions to prejudice in participants’ open-ended responses, suggesting 
that there was no evidence of a demand characteristic. However, measuring attributions to 
prejudice by evaluating participants’ written responses also has its limitations. Some participants 
may have suspected that prejudice was expressed, but did not clearly reveal this in their 
responses. Therefore, what may have been actually measured in this case was the participants’ 
threshold for clearly reporting an attribution to prejudice. 
The measurement of the PMAPS in the current studies was also designed to minimize 
demand characteristics. The measurement of PMAPS being separated on average about one 
month prior to participation in the experiments was a strength of the design because this feature 
limited priming participants’ thoughts of racial discrimination. However, this feature could also 
be considered a limitation because it introduced measurement error. Prior research (Miller, 
Hockett, & Saucier, manuscript in preparation) found that the test-retest reliability of the PMAPS 
to be acceptable (r = .68), but perhaps not as high as might be expected by a reliable measure of 
a truly trait-like construct. Beliefs, expectations, and cognitive tendencies may be relatively more 
stable over longer periods of time compared to more state-like constructs, but they are not as 
stable as traits. Thus, by introducing a time delay between the measurement of the PMAPS and 
the dependent measures into the design of the current studies, measurement error was potentially 
introduced due to the possibility that participants’ tendencies to make attributions to prejudice 
may have changed over that time period of time. Such measurement error may have attenuated 
the strength of the observed PMAPS effects. Furthermore, the observed scale reliabilities for the 
PMAPS in the current studies were acceptable, but also an additional source of measurement 
error. Despite these limitations, the PMAPS was generally found to be a significant predictor of 
attributions to prejudice in the current studies. 
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One final limitation should be noted regarding the inconsistency in the evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that the tendency to make attributions to prejudice will be stronger 
when information about harm and intent is most ambiguous. Although the required sample sizes 
for both studies were estimated using a priori power analyses in which the effect sizes were 
based on prior PMAPS studies, the observed effect sizes for the condition X PMAPS interactions 
in the current studies were relatively weak (possibly due to the additional source of measurement 
error described above related to the measurement of the PMAPS several weeks before presenting 
participants with the stimuli and dependent measures). Furthermore, because of the loss of 
analyzable cases due to participants’ incomplete responses and the failure to match all 
participants’ data from part one (where PMAPS was measured) and part two (where the 
manipulation occurred and the dependent measures were gathered), the sample sizes in both 
studies were less than the target sample sizes estimated from the a priori power analyses. Post-
hoc power analyses using the observed average effect size (R2 increase) for the key dependent 
measures (attributions of prejudice to the actor and to the behavior) revealed that even if the 
target sample sizes were achieved, the studies would have been underpowered to find significant 
evidence of moderation (Study 1 power = .51, Study 2 power = .16). 
 Future Directions 
Despite these limitations and the need for additional research, having the capability to 
measure differences in peoples’ tendencies to perceive prejudice has many important research 
applications that can contribute to our understanding of the psychology of prejudice. For 
example, individual differences in the tendency to perceive prejudice may be related to 
differences in individuals’ prototypes for the expression of prejudice (e.g. Inman & Baron, 1996; 
Marti et al., 2000), or the tendency to perceive non-prototypical forms of prejudice (e.g., 
prejudice towards women who have been raped; Hockett, Saucier, & Badke, 2012; prejudice 
toward individuals with intellectual disabilities; McManus, Feyes, & Saucier, 2011). Similarly, 
the tendency to make attributions to prejudice may affect how individuals perceive, or 
misperceive the intent to use humor to disparage social outgroups, or the intent to use humor to 
subvert a culture of prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Saucier, Strain, & Till, manuscript in 
preparation; Strain, dissertation in preparation). Future research should also examine whether 
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individual differences in judgments of prejudice in prototypical and non-prototypical expressions 
are a function of automatic or controlled cognitive processes (e.g., Devine, 1989). 
It may also be useful to examine how individual differences in attributions to prejudice 
operate at the cognitive level from the theoretical perspective of Signal Detection Theory (SDT). 
As already suggested in the introduction, the PMAPS may be measuring individual differences in 
the threshold for making an attribution to prejudice (i.e., detecting prejudice), such that 
individuals higher in the tendency to make attributions to prejudice have a lower threshold for 
detecting prejudice. Future research could use SDT paradigms to systematically manipulate 
different levels of information that positively indicate prejudice (i.e., the signal) in addition to, or 
in combination with, different levels of information that negatively indicate prejudice or 
attenuate the signal in other ways (i.e., informational noise). 
Additionally, the PMAPS may be related to differences in perceptions of the social 
consequences of publically acknowledging instances of racial prejudice and discrimination. For 
example, individuals who are more or less likely to perceive prejudice in the world around them 
may differ in terms of whether they fear that the personal costs of communicating their 
judgments to others (e.g., Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003) is outweighed by the societal costs of 
being silent (e.g., allowing prejudice to go unchallenged). Similarly, individuals may also 
perceive different costs (e.g., to themselves, the targets, and the accused) of making different 
types of errors (e.g., false positives vs. false negatives) in judgments of prejudice. These different 
perceptions of risk may further help explain individual variation in perceiving and reporting 
expressions of prejudice. Furthermore, support for social programs that seek to help the targets of 
prejudice (e.g., affirmative action, civil rights legislation), or programs that are aimed at 
improving intergroup relations (e.g., diversity initiatives) may be related to a combination of the 
tendency to perceive prejudice and beliefs about the negative societal consequences of prejudice. 
In addition to predicting when attributions to prejudice might occur, the current research 
may be extended to examine factors that increase or decrease the tendency to make attributions 
to prejudice. For example, the PMAPS could be used as a dependent measure for interventions 
that attempt to raise social consciousness regarding racial prejudice and discrimination. 
Conversely, research on how different experiences, motivations, and political orientations work 
to attenuate the tendency to make attributions to prejudice may increase our understanding of the 
different psychological processes that lead to (arguably false) beliefs that, at least in the United 
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States, we are living in a post-racial society where prejudice and discrimination are no longer a 
problem. 
 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the PMAPS will contribute to our theoretical understanding about how 
different individual differences and social contexts operate through motivational and cognitive 
mechanisms to facilitate or hinder the recognition of subtle expressions of prejudice. The broader 
impacts of this work will be to advance our understanding of how prejudice and discrimination 
are perceived by third parties. An understanding of attributions to prejudice made by observers, 
especially by members of dominant groups, has important societal implications in that 
bystanders’ judgments are often implicated when dealing with instances of prejudice and 
discrimination. In a contemporary society in which prejudice emerges often under the cover of 
ambiguity, understanding the processes that underlie perceptions of prejudice is essential in 
understanding contemporary intergroup relations. 
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Appendix A - The Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice 
Scale 
Expectation 
1. People discriminate against people who are not like them. 
2. Racist behavior is more widespread than people think it is. 
3. Other people treat minorities based on stereotypes. 
4. You'll see lots of racism if you look for it. 
Trivialization 
5. Racial minorities are too worried about being discriminated against. 
6. Racial minorities are too sensitive about stereotypes. 
7. Minorities today are overly worried about being victims of racism. 
8. People are overly concerned about racial issues. 
Vigilance 
9. I think about why racial minorities are treated stereotypically. 
10. I think about whether people act in a prejudiced or discriminatory manner. 
11. I consider whether people's actions are prejudiced or discriminatory. 
12. I am on the lookout for instances of prejudice or discrimination. 
Efficacy 
13. I am quick to recognize prejudice. 
14. My friends think I'm good at spotting racism. 
15. I find that prejudice and discrimination are pretty easy to spot. 
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Appendix B - Vignettes 
 
The image above was used to convey the race of the actor and the target and identify the names 
and roles of the characters for the vignettes used in Studies 1 and 2. 
 Base Vignette 
Jason was looking for an apartment prior to the start of the fall semester at college. He 
submitted a rental application to Mike, the landlord. Mike showed Jason the apartment and said 
that he would get back to him regarding whether he could rent it out to Jason. A few days later, 
Mike phoned Jason to say that he was renting the apartment out to another individual. 
 Study 1 Harm Manipulation 
No Harm Ending 
Jason was not disappointed because he had already found an apartment he liked better. 
Ambiguous Harm Ending 
(No additional information was given.) 
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Clear Harm Ending 
Jason was very disappointed because he had to eventually settle for an apartment that he 
didn’t like nearly as much. 
 Study 2 Intent Manipulation 
No Intent Ending 
A few days later, Mike phoned Jason to say that he was renting the apartment out to 
another individual who was higher on the waiting list. 
Ambiguous Intent Ending 
(No additional information was given.) 
Clear Intent Ending 
A few days later, Mike phoned Jason to say that he was renting the apartment out to 
another individual. Mike suspected that Jason, being a young Black male, may keep company 
with people he didn’t want hanging around the building. 
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Appendix C - Dependent Measures 
The following items were used as dependent measures in both Studies 1 and 2. 
 Open-Ended Question 
Why do you think that Mike did not rent the apartment to Jason? Please write your thoughts in 
the space provided. 
 Attributions of Harm 
1. Using your best judgment, how much harm did Mike cause Jason? 
2. Using your best judgment, how much emotional distress did Mike cause Jason? 
3. Using your best judgment, how much psychological distress did Mike cause Jason? 
 Attributions of Intent 
1. Using your best judgment, how much did Mike intend to harm Jason? 
2. Using your best judgment, how much did Mike intend to racially discriminate against 
Jason? 
3. Using your best judgment, how much did Mike intend to express prejudice toward Jason? 
 Attributions of Prejudiced Behavior 
1. Mike's behavior was racist. 
2. Mike demonstrated bias toward Blacks. 
3. Mike racially discriminated against Jason. 
4. Mike's behavior was fair. (reversed) 
 Attributions of Prejudiced Actor 
1. Mike is racist toward Blacks. 
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2. Mike is prejudiced toward Blacks. 
3. Mike holds negative stereotypes about Blacks. 
4. Mike has positive feelings about Blacks. (reversed) 
 Filler Items 
1. Mike didn’t think enough about the consequences of what he was doing. 
2. Mike's behavior was typical. 
3. Most people would do the same thing as Mike in this situation. 
4. Mike's behavior was insensitive. 
5. Mike's behavior was foolish. 
6. Mike's behavior was unkind. 
7. Mike's behavior was surprising. 
8. I would do the same thing as Mike in this situation. 
9. I feel sorry for Jason. 
10. I would not want to be associated with Mike. 
11. If I could, I would help Jason. 
12. I would not hold Mike's behavior against him. 
13. Mike meant no harm by what he did. 
14. Jason probably thought that Mike was prejudiced. 
15. Jason probably thought that Mike was racist. 
16. Jason probably thought that Mike racially discriminated against him. 
17. Jason probably thought that Mike's behavior was racist. 
18. Jason probably thought that Mike's behavior was prejudiced. 
19. If I was Jason, I would be very upset at Mike. 
